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In a key-note address to Law students of the University of Zimbabwe on May 
9, 1980 the then Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Simbi V. 
Mubako, called upon the academic lawyer to be an activist and a crusader for 
social justice arid concluded that:
“The academic lawyer, the practising lawyer and society as a whole 
must.continue. . .  the fight for social justice, so that there is not one 
law for the rich and another for the poor.”
1 This was a call on the academic lawyer to be partisan arid be on the side of 
the mass of the people in their fight for equality and social justice. In the words 
of Africa’s revolutionary martyr Samora Machcl:
“As men, as a country, as a State, we must always choose which side 
we are on: on the side of a privileges handful, with the people against 
. us, or on the side of the people, with a dethroned privileged handful 
against us.”1
In this paper I not only answer Simbi Mubako’s call to be an activist and a 
crusader for social justice, but I also clearly choose which side I am on. 
Consequently, this article makes no pretence or claim to a mythical professorial 
and academic neutrality in discussing and analysing the recognition and enforce­
ment of human rights in Africa, in general and Zimbabwe, in particular. The 
approach adopted here is clearly partisan and articulates the demands of the mass 
of the peasants and working people of Zimbabwe for human rights and dignity. 
Partisanship in this particular case is not to be mistaken for subjectiveness and 
bias in the non-scientific sense. Partisanship is used in the objective sense of 
evaluating, upholding and fighting for those objective material and social 
conditions for the achievement of social justice.
' l
Having defined my approach as clearly partisan, I will approach the discus­
sion of human rights in the following manner:
Firstly, I will seek to demonstrate the importance of discussing human rights 
within the specificity of their historical development with a view to underlining
*
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the fact that human rights are not natural and inherent in man but invariably arise 
out of demands and victories of peoples in social and political struggles. The 
content and practical enjoyment of human rights under capitalism and under 
socialism will be used to illustrate the historically determined class nature of 
human rights.
Secondly, I will show how human rights became a focus of international 
concern particularly in the post-second world war period, thus making it unsafe 
for any regime to openly reject the principle of protecting human rights.
Thirdly, I will give an overview of the economic and polidcal conditions that 
negate the recognition, enforcement and enjoyment of human rights in African 
countries dominated by imperialism. It will be argued that the economic 
dependence and exploitadon of prachcally all African countries inevitably gives 
rise to undemocradc insdtutions which are incompatible with the recognition of 
and/or respect for most of the often canonized bourgeois political and civil rights.
Fourthly, I will discuss the recognition and enforcement of human rights in 
Zimbabwe as embodied in the Lancaster House Constitution of 1979 with 
particular reference to the protection of the right to personal liberty as affected 
by and derogated from during a State of Emergency as has existed in the country 
since 1965.
Fifthly, and lastly, I will argue the case for the continuation of a justiciable 
Bill of Rights after the expiry of the entrenched clauses of the Lancaster House 
Constitution in 1990.
THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Any scientific and analytical approach that seeks to understand any social or 
legal phenomenon must inevitably trace that phenomenon to its emergence in 
history with a view to explaining,the social, political and economic conditions 
thatgaverise to the phenomenon. The concept ofhuman rights as understoodand 
recognised today has not always existed. Primitive societies, slave owning 
societies and feudal societies did not recognise any human rights provisions. 
Equality of all persons as a social and legal doctrine was unknown to these early 
societies in which the recognition and enforcement of the present day civil and 
political rights would have totally negated the social organisation of those 
societies. For example, Roman Law jurists of the Roman Slave Empire, would 
have dismissed as absurd the claim or idea that slaves and, indeed, peregrenes, 
were inherently entitled to equal political status and protection of the law. 
Consistently, Roman law could not recognise and enforce the “natural right” of 
slaves to be protected from slavery, forced labour, inhuman treatment and torture 
when a slave owner had a legally protected right to flog, torture and kill his slave 
at any time and for whatever, eccentric or otherwise, reason that may have suited 
r; his fancy and whims. The slave had no right to life. Similarly a feudal serf could 
have no “natural right” to equality before the law and to equal political status. He 
could have no legal or social claim against forced labour, against invasion of his
56
“home” and privacy; he could have no freedom of association, expression or 
movement in circumstances where the social and legal regime sanctioned his 
inequality and bondage to serfdom.
The concept of protected human rights first emerges in history during the 
struggles arid revolutions of the bourgeoisie against feudal fetters and absolut­
ism. The call and clamour for recognition, respect and enforcement of human 
rights was adopted by the bourgeoisie as a battle cry against feudalism and its 
inequities. The bourgeoisie rallied behind it, all the other oppressed elements of 
society in its assault on feudalism in claiming equality of all persons before the 
law. It must, however, be noted that the idea or notion of “equality” of all human 
beings pre-dates the bourgeois revolutions and is as old as man’s civilization. 
Thus the idea of equality—that all human beings have something in common and 
to that extent are also equal—is an ancient idea. However, the modem concrete 
demand for social equality and equality before the law is something relatively 
new and qualitatively different from the primitive notions of equality of all 
human beings by virtue of their being human.2 As already observed, this demand 
for equality and protection of human rights was given meaning and content by 
the bourgeoisie in its struggles against feudalism which negated and hindered the 
development and full realisation of the process of industrialisation and capital 
accumulation by chaining serfs to the land of the aristocracy and landlords and 
thereby denying the bourgeoisie a “free reserve pool of labour” to be used in their 
emerging factories and other enterprises. The process of industrialization 
introduced and led by the bourgeoisie required the availability of “free” human 
beings who could be hired by the bourgeoisie in their factories and other 
enterprises. The existence of such a pool of “free” human beings was negated by 
feudalism and its system of serfdom. In these circumstances the bourgeoisie 
demanded the liberation of all persons from all feudal fetters and the establish­
ment of equality of rights by the abolition of feudal inequalities. This revolution­
ary bourgeois demand which was fully supported by serfs became a battle cry 
against the absolutism of feudalism. Engels says of this batde cry:
“. . .  it was raised in the interests of industry and trade, it was also 
necessary to demand the same equality of rights for the great mass of 
\th e  peasantry who, in every degree of bondage, from total serfdom 
onwards, were compelled to give the greater part of their labour time 
to their liege lord without compensation and in addition to render 
innumerable other dues to him and the state.”3
Therefore, what should be underlined is that the concept of human rights as 
a concrete historical phenomenon was first articulated and introduced by the 
bourgeois class in its fight against feudalism. It is therefore, clearly false to 
present human rights as “eternal inalienable, unalterable fundamental values 
inherent in man”, which can be claimed “by everybody at any time and iri any
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case”, as, some bourgeois scholars often do.4 Human rights are clearly an 
outcome of demands made and won by people in political and social struggles. 
These demands arise from the concrete material conditions that would be in 
existence in any particular society. If the concept of human rights is viewed from 
this context it is clear there can be no eternal and invariable human rights and that 
the concept of human rights has not always existed as a socially recognized 
enforceable concept.
Engels5 has clearly demonstrated that human rights have a historical and 
class character and cannot be presented as eternal truths that were discovered by 
some ingenious minds.
, While it was the bourgeoisie that championed the cause for the recognition 
of human rights, it must be realized that when the bourgeoisie demanded equality 
vand freedom they were in alliance with the mass of the people because the class 
demands of the bourgeoisie, which wcrcdircctcdagainst the feudal nobility, also 
objectively expressed interests of the mass of the serfs who were suffering from 
the oppression and exploitation of the feudal nobility. It was objectively in the 
interests of the mass of the people to abolish aristocratic privileges, the limita­
tions imposed by the system of guilds, the feudal lies to the soil, the .flagrant 
injustice of the despotism of feudal landlords and the totalitarianism of the feudal 
monarchs.6
Thus the driving force behind the recognition and enforcement of human 
rights provisions has been invariably the struggle of peoples demanding respect 
for their rights and dignity as human beings. This fact, however, should not be 
allowed to obscure the class content of human rights in the sense that their 
content is inextricably linked to their historical character as having bccn.won by 
a definite class in social struggles. The bourgeoisie having vanquished feudalism 
proclaimed all sorts of rights. The most notable of such rights were declared in 
the French and American Declarations on the Rights of Man.7 But these rights, 
as proclaimed by the successful bourgeoisie, did not apply to all human beings. 
For example, the American Declaration of Independence of 1776, asserted that:
“We hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are created equal, 
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights 
that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of Happiness
Z. L. Rev. Vol. 5 1987
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6 See W. Weichclt “Some Remarks on the Concept of Human Rights” in Law and
Legislation in the G.D.R. Vol. 2, 1978 pp. 37-39 -
7 For the full texts of these Declarations, see I. Brownlie, Basic Documents on 
Human Rights, Oxford University Press, London 1971, pp. 8-10 andpp. 11-13 
respectively.
58 Ncube, Human Rights in Zimbabwe
This ringing declaration of equality of all “men” by the makers and founding 
fathers of the American Constitution did not and could not apply to all human 
beings. Most of the founders and makers of the American Constitution were 
themselves slave-owners who had enriched and continued to enrich themselves 
through the commerce of trading in black human beings, selling and exchanging 
them in the slave market as if they were animals. Surely, the slaves could not have 
been “created equal” when they were legally subjected to slavery!, It took 
Americans a hundred years after their Declaration of Independence and a bloody 
civil war to abolish the abominable and inhuman system of slavery. The fact that 
the founders of the American constitution were able to portray themselves as 
ardent democrats and respecters of human rights in their Constitutional declara­
tions and yet American society continued to practice and perpetuate slavery, 
clearly shows the bourgeois and racial character of the human rights they 
proclaimed.
r \ .
Thus, while pronouncing the natural equality of all human beings, the 
American Constitution, in the same breath, confirmed the slavery of the black 
Americans who were, for census purposes, counted as constituting three-fifths 
of a white human being.
Could there be a greater affront to human dignity and human equality? Could 
there be a clearer illustration of the class character of human rights, even though 
they are invariably expressed in such abstract formulations as if they apply to 
everyone irrespective of his race or social position? Further, the founding fathers 
of the American Constitution did not conceive of women as equal beings. Their 
use of the term “men” was not accidental but reflected their conception of women 
whom they denied the right to vote and participate in the political affairs of the 
country, as unequal to men. Indeed, as late as 1873 the American Supreme Court 
was to deny Myra Bradwell the right to beadmitted to the Illinois Bar on the basis 
that she was a woman and under male protection. The Supreme Court declared:
“Man is, or should be, a woman’s protector andjdcfender. The natural 
and proper timidity and delicacy which bclongs to the female sex 
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life.”®
It was not until 1975 that the United States Supreme Court reversed this 
judicial perception of women when it criticized the Bradwell case “reasoning” 
as reflective of “romantic paternalism” that put “women not on a pedestal but in 
a cage”8 9
The human rights declared and endorsed by the bourgeoisie were clearly 
rights of a privileged few. Not everyone was entitled to these rights, the civil and
8 See Bradwell v Illinios,%3 U.S. (16 Wall) 130 (1873) atlpp. 141-142. For similar 
reasoning in discriminating against women see Muller v Oregon 208 U.S. 412 
(1908)
9 See Fronteiro v Richardson 411 U.S. 7(1975).
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political rights of the bourgeoisie. They were rights of a certain class of men, the 
propertied men.. ]
Their persons, their privacy, their freedom, their liberty and above all their 
property were deemed worthy of protection by the law and the state. It i s they who 
enjoyed the freedom to participate in the political affairs of the country. The 
British Parliament, for example, has existed for 50010 years and yet not until 1918 
were the elections of its members based on a universal franchise embodying the 
democratic principle of one person one vote.11 Membership of Parliament and 
the right to vote was a privilege of the rich up until 1885 when working men won 
the franchise.12 The industrial middle-class and lower-middle classes had been 
added to the franchise in 1832 and 1867 respectively.13 Women only won the 
right to vote in 1918 when universal suffrage was introduced by the Represen­
tation of the People Act, 1918.
\
i The French Declaration of the Rights of man, prefixed to the Constitution of
1791 declared that: “Men are bom and live free and equal in their rights... “ and 
yet the right to participate in the political processes belonged only to the 
propertied classes of men.
What clearly emerges from this historical perspective is that human rights 
have a definite class character which is linked (to their concrete historical 
development. That the rights declared by the bourgeoisie were only to be enjoyed 
by them is borne by the misery and deaths of the era of the industrial revolution 
during which the working people toiled and died in bourgeois factories where 
they worked and were brutalised under inhuman conditionsr
The characterization of human rights as possessing a definite class content 
inevitably leads us to the conclusion succinctly summarized by W. Weichelt 
thus:
r
“No ruling bourgeoisie—whatever humanistic it may pretend to be in 
its declarations is in a position to allow the working class to imple­
ment the human rights proclaimed and constantly canonized by the 
bourgeoisie if these classes interpret this very freedom also as freedom 
from capitalist exploitation and oppression, if equality includes the 
transformation o f capitalists into workers and fraternity is understood L 
as abolition of capitalist competition, which is based on the fierce 
struggle for existence of everyone against everyone . . .  The human
10 See W. Bagehot, The English Constitution, pp. 252-265 and H. Street and R. 
Brazier, Constitutionary and Administrative Law de Smith, (4th ed), Penguin 
Books, Middlesex 1981, p.235.
11 See the Representation of the People Act, 1918.
12 See the Reform Act, 1885
13 See the Reform Act, 1932 and the Reform Act, 1867 respectively. See also W.-' 
Bagehot, supra pp. 267-283.
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rights of the bourgeoisie are not those of the working classes, that 
between them there exists the same contradiction as in the antagonism 
between the working class and the bourgeoisie in general. The 
capitalists’ right to own capital is the injustice of exploitation for the 
worker. The expropriation o f his enterprise, which the capitalist 
considers as injustice, however, is the worker’s right to be free from  
exploitation and oppression”14
This fundamental difference in the bourgeoisie and working class concep­
tions of human rights and equality is inextricably linked to the class struggles 
from which the concept of human rights emerged. Consequently, the history of 
mankind after the bourgeois revolutions has been a history of social battles to end 
inequality, discrimination and to extend the basic rights proclaimed by the 
bourgeoisie to all members of society. The central actors in these struggles have 
been peasants, workers, religious groups, women, emergent nations and ethnic 
minorities.
It is hoped that this historical sketch of the emergence of the notion of human 
rights and its legal recognition and enforcement after the fall of feudalism has 
demonstrated the importance of discussing human rights within the context of 
their historical development. The historical perspective, it is hoped, has demon­
strated the class character of human rights and that they are not eternal, 
inalienable, unalterable fundamental rights inherent in man, which can be 
claimed by everyone at anytime and at any place, regardless of his social 
position.15
HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER CAPITALISM
The objectiveof theabove historical perspective has been to demonstrate that 
human rights do not represent eternal, universal and inalienable values inherent 
in man, which values have always been acknowledged, recognized and enforced 
by law. The nation of human rights as a recognized and enforceable concept 
emerged with the emergence of the capitalist system which vanquished feudal­
ism.
The bourgeoisie after vanquishing feudalism declared that all human beings 
were free and equal. They formulated and declared civil and political liberties, 
the so-called first generation of rights. They declared that all human beings are 
born equal, that everyone has a right to life; liberty; security of the person, equal
14 Op citp.35 See also “Fundamental Questions Concerning the Theory and History 
of Citizens ’ Rights”, by Imre Szabo in Socialist Conception o f  Human Rights, pp. 
27-81 -
15 See generally V Bolshakov, This Whole Human Rights Business, Progress 
Publishers, Moscow 1980, K Marx and F. Engels, The Holy Family Or Critique 
o f Critical Criticism, Progress Publishers, Moscow 1975 and G Maltsey, An 
Illusion o f  Equal Rights, Progress Publishers, Moscow 1982.
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protection of the law freedom of expression, assembly and conscience; freedom 
from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment and a right to be protected from 
deprivation of his property.
i ' . \ "
The bourgeoisie expressed and continues to express these rights in abstract 
formulations which make it appear as if these rights are for everyone and capable 
of being claimed and enjoyed by everybody notwithstanding their particular 
material, economic and social circumstances. However, operating in a class 
society in which the majority of people have been materially deprived while a 
minority own and possess all of society’s wealth, these rights are meaningless to 
the majority of the people. In a class society how can people have equal 
protection of the law when they have no equal access to the courts and have, 
therefore, no equal capacity to mobilize the law? The poor cannot have justice 
because they have no capacity to enforce or defend their rights in the courts. The 
position is aptly summarized by the English saying that the doors of the Ritz 
Hotel are open to everyone. Yet only the very rich can afford to pass through 
them.
In practice, therefore, the civil and political liberties enshrined in the 
constitutions of capitalist countries notwithstanding their abstract formulations 
are capable of enjoyment only by the propertied classes who have resources to 
mobilize the system. The working classes have no material capacity to assert and 
defend the theoretical rights they possess.
Thus under capitalism the declared political and civil rights are only for the 
bourgeoisie in the sense that only they have the capacity to fully enjoy these ^ 
rights and hence their characterization as bourgeois rights. Human rights are 
therefore class rights. For example, the Constitution of the United State of 
America contains one of the most elaborate Declaration of Rights in the world, j 
Among other things, the Constitution enshrines the rights to equal protection of 
the law, the rights to liberty; the rights to freedom of assembly, expression and 
conscience and the right to life.'6 However, in the United States of America more 
than 20 million people are unemployed, homeless and destitute and live in 
conditions of abject poverty, some of them often starving to death. Hundreds die 
of cold in the streets every winter while millions are illiterate.16 7 In Britain it is 
common knowledge that more than 15 million people are jobless, homeless, poor 
and destitute. Thousands sleep in the open air and many of them die of cold in 
winter. All these people supposedly have a right to life and yet they are denied 
by the capitalist system the means of living. What meaning does the elaborate 
American Bill of Rights have to these millions of people? Without socio­
economic rights the enshrined political and civil rights are, for practical purpose, 
worthless to these people who are continually being dehumanized by the 
capitalist system. Even though they are homeless, bourgeois law forbids them
16 See the first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution as well as the 13th, 14th and 
15th Amendments.
See The Sunday Mail, 8th.April, 1987.17
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from sleeping under bridges. Indeed, in its majestic neutrality and total disregard 
of social inequalities bourgeois law forbids both the rich and the poor and 
homeless from sleeping under bridges. But then the rich have no reason to sleep 
under bridges. This is the bourgeois understanding of equal protection of the law.
The administration of any capitalist system invariably results in iniquities 
. occasioned by material inequality, racial and class prejudice and sexual discrimi­
nation. Notwithstanding the equal protection of the law clauses of the United 
States Constitution the working classes and proletariat have no access to the 
protection of the law while black people are discriminated against in a variety of 
ways. Even the administration of justice is heavily weighted against black people 
because of the prejudice of a white dominated judiciary.
The point is that the capitalist system being based on social inequalities does 
not allow all the people to enjoy the abstractly formulated human rights 
canonized in bourgeois constitutions. Wherever there is social inequality, social 
deprivation, unemployment, poverty, homelessness and hunger human rights 
provisions wjould remain meaningless to the socially deprived, homeless and 
unemployed. The bourgeois attitude towards the denial of socio-economic rights 
is aptly expressed in the words of the great bourgeois judge Lord Denning (M.R) 
in Southwark v London Borough Council v Williams (1971) CH. 734.at 744.
“If homelessness were once admitted as a defence to trespass, no 
one’s house would be safe . . .  so the courts must for the sake of law 
and order take a firm stand. They must refuse to admit a plea of 
necessity to the hungry and the homeless, and trust that their distress 
will be relieved by the charitable and the good.”
HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER SOCIALISM
Marxism-Leninism starts from the standpoint that the abolition of capitalist 
exploitation isa pre-condition for the popular enjoyment of human rights. In this 
no dichotomy is drawn between civil and political rights on the one hand and 
socio-economic rights on the other. In Marxian terms human rights include civil, 
political and socio-economic rights on the basis that one is impossible without 
the other. Thus, socio-economic rights and civil rights are an inseparable unit that 
can only be realised in their totality under socialism which abolishes exploitation 
and social inequality. Only socialism can guarantee the enjoyment of both socio­
economic and civil rights. Only under socialism can the rights to work, to 
education, to housing and to free health services be realized and guaranteed. 
Only socialism can establish material equality of all persons and equal protection 
of the law. Only under socialism can the social evils of poverty, homelessness, 
hunger and starvation be abolished forever.
That the abolition of poverty, hunger, illiteracy and unemployment is only 
possible under socialism has been amply demonstrated by the achievements of 
socialists countries such as the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, 
Hungary and many others.
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In these countries there is, for all practical purposes, one hundred percent 
employment and literacy. Exploitation has been abolished and socialist democ­
racy instituted.
The success of socialism in various countries has clearly falsified the 
argument of bourgeois ideologies who have attempted to argue that only civil 
and political rights are natural and inherent in man and, therefore, capable of 
constitutional recognition and enforcement. A number of bourgeois scholars 
usually insist that socio-economic rights are unnatural and constitute mere moral 
demands on the.state which cannot be constitutionally recognised and enforced 
like other legal rights.18 Consequently, they argue that it is meaningless to 
constitutionally guarantee socio-economic rights. Of course, it is meaningless to 
declare socio-economic rights in a capitalist country because capitalism is a total 
negation of socio-economic rights. However, where capitalism has been abol­
ished socio-economic rights can be and are infact guaranteed and realized.
THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF THE 
DEMAND FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
We have seen that the notion of human rights as a concrete concept did not 
come into existence until the American and French Declarations on the Rights 
of Man.19 However, the concept of human rights did not receive universal 
international recognition and serious concerted attention and concern until after 
the Second World War. Before the Second world War, some first world countries 
recognised and enforced political and civil rights (the so-called first generation 
of human rights) within theirown jurisdictions. It was not until the 1917 Socialist 
Revolution in the US SR that economic, social and cultural rights were asserted, 
recognised, formulated and enforced. Before the 1917 Socialist Revolution in 
the USSR, no country in the world recognised and implemented socio-economic 
rights. All of those countries that recognised and protected human rights 
provisions were concerned with civil and political rights, namely the right to life, 
liberty, protection of the law, freedom of conscience, expression, religion and 
assembly protection of private property, protection from torture and inhuman 
treatment, etc.
After the Second World War and having been shaken by the barbarity of the 
war and the horrors of Nazism, independent nations moved determinedly to try 
and prevent a recurrence of that barbarism; Article 1, para 3 of thcUnilcd Nations 
Charter defined one of the goals of the United Nations a “to achieve international 
co-operation in ... promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion”. Soon after the establishment of the United Nations, word on the 
drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights began. The United 
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in December 1948. The Declaration which is not legally binding on signatory 
states starts off thus:
“Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of equal and 
inalienable rights to all members of the human family is the founda­
tion of freedom, justice and peace in the world.
This statemint links world peace with the respect for human rights with the 
clear implication that human rights (whatever their content) are impossible to 
enjoy without peace.
This conclusion was dictated by the barbarism and cruel experience of the 
Second World War. It is here that the starling point of the human rights question 
as a matter of international concern is to be found.
After adopting the Universal Declaration of Rights in 1948 the United 
Nations General Assembly instructed The Commission of Human Rights “as a 
matter of priority” to complete the task of producing something that would be 
legally binding,20 namely “a draft convention on human rights and draft meas­
ures of implementations.”21
The Commission produced two covenants, namely the International Cove­
nant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. These Covenants were adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly in December 1966. However, a significant number 
of countries, including theUnitcd States of America, have notas yetratified these 
convenants.22
In Europe the Western European countries adopted the European Conven­
tion on Human Rights in 1950 while the Organisation of American States 
adopted its own regional Convention on Human Rights in 1969. In Africa, the 
Organisation of African Unity, adopted its own regional instrument on Human 
Rights called the African Charter of Human and People’s Rights in 1981.
This international trend towards recognition and respect for human rights, be 
it under the auspices of the United Nations or regional organisations, has 
increasingly put the human rights question in the forefront of the focus of the 
international community. Human rights have accordingly become an important 
area of concern for scholars, social activities and other international agencies or 
actors. This international concern must be understood within the context of the 
savage tyranny, oppression and exploitation that has been witnessed by mankind 
since the end of the Second World War.
20 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not binding on States but 
constitutes a mere expression of intent to promote human rights.
21 See M. Cranston op cit p. 155
22 Ibid, pp.57-59 and V. Kuaryavtsev “Human Rights Concept” in Social Science, 
Vol.I, 1987, pp. 90-91
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Brutal regimes that did not and do not respect freedom and liberties of any 
kind such as the cruel and inhuman governments of Idi Amin in Uganda, J. 
Bokassa in the Central African Republic, I. Smith in Rhodesia, Botha in South 
Africa, Pinochet in Chile and many others have rallied progressive international 
activists to the defence of humanity. Thus the proliferation of brutal and 
repressive regimes in the World, being a total negation of human rights, should 
be a major concern for all progressive mankind.
{
International interest arid activism in the field of human rights has put the 
human rights question at the forefront of international issues so that human rights 
have taken hold of the aspirations of people throughout the world to the extent 
that it is no longer safe for rulers to openly reject the content of human rights. 
However, that notwithstanding, gross violations of human rights continues to 
plague most countries of the world. Most people of the Third World, not only 
suffer from material deprivation, exploitation, poverty and hunger, but live 
under neo-fascist dictatorial regimes who owe allegiance only to themselves and 
their imperialist sponsors. The brutality of most such regimes is today well 
documented due to the tireless and courageous efforts of human rights organisa­
tions and activists supported by all sections of the progressive international 
community. The bizarre and barbaric human rights violations of Master Sergeant 
Samuel Doe’s neo-fascist regime in Liberia are well documented in LIBERIA; 1 
A Promise Betrayed: A report on Human Rights by the Lawyer’s Committee for 
Human Rights, 1976. This report that chronicles mass summary executions 
(including dismemberment and cannibalism), political detentions, rapings, 
flogging and torture, kidnappings and abductions, judicial corruption and other 
acts of savage brutality committed by an army long gone out of control, make 
chilling reading and is representative of human rights conditions in most 
countries of the Third World.
Regrettably, however, most reports on Human Rights have concerned 
themselves with violations of political and civil liberties to the almost total 
exclusion of the denial of basic socio-economic rights without which civil and 
political liberties are impossible to enjoy for the mass of the people. Denials of 
socio-economic rights are most pronounced in the Third World countries under 
the grip of imperialism and in the imperialist countries, themsel ves, particularly 
Britain and the United States of America where millions of people are homeless 
and unemployed.
HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS IN AFRICA
Historical Background
The concept or principle of human rights as understood today was unknown 
in pre-colonial Africa dominated by feudal despotism. Any pretensions to the 
contrary by European apologetic scholars arid African nationalists are palpably 
false and are without any historical foundation. Falling within this category of 
scholars is Nasila Selasini Rembc, who, in Africa and Regional Protection of
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Human Rights attempts to argue that traditional African societies were in fact 
preoccupied with human rights, be they groups or individual rights. The concepts 
of equality before the law, protection of private property and freedom were 
totally negated by the despotism of feudal monarchs who were a law unto 
themselves. In Zimbabwe, for exanple, the feudal mode of production allowed 
the Ndebele State to persistently raid the Shona kingdoms to appropriate their 
cattle. Within, the Ndebele State itself democracy was conspicuous by its total 
absence. The king ruled, consulting only his royal advisers. Women were 
dominated, oppressed and underprivileged. They were under a state of quasi­
ownership by their fathers or husbands or some other male relative. The truth of 
the matter is that there could be no recognition of any meaningful human rights 
under feudalism for the feudal mode of production negated the recognition of the 
“lofty ideals and values” of equality.
Thus pre-colonial Africa knew and recognized no concept of human rights. 
Colonialism itself was also no respecter of human rights. Apart from Latin 
America perhaps, no other continent has suffered a more consistent negation of 
human rights than Africa. The transatlantic slave trade, colonialism itself (the 
worst manifestation of which is apartheid), racial discrimination and oppression, 
and the imperialistacts of plunder of Africa’s natural resource have all combined 
to leave a sad and tragic trail of abuses of human rights in Africa. Although all, 
but two, of Africa’s countries have been liberated from colonialism, the savage 
imprints of colonialism remain in virtually all such countries. As N. Rembe 
correctly points out:
Colonialism is a negation of human rights: colonial rule in Africa 
established and maintained itself by most ruthless measures that 
affronted the dignity of the African.. .  “
The worst and most barbaric form of colonialism, apartheid, has been 
characterized by the international community as a crime against humanity. 
Those blacks who grew up up in colonial Africa will readily understand the 
inhumanity of colonialism and racial oppression. Those of us who were bom and 
grew up in racist Rhodesia are still haunted by the memories of the dehumani­
zation and degradation to which our fathers were subjected to by an inhuman and 
cruel system of racism under which an elderly African man was commanded 
degraded and dehuminized by a system that allowed young white boys to treat 
Africans as sub-human things.
However, the crucial point that needs to be underlined is that colonialism, as 
a negation of human rights in itself, did not introduce human rights in Africa. 
This means that up until the time of independence African countries had no basis 
for and no history of the recognition and enforcement of human rights. The 
colonial state was by definition repressive, totalitarian and engaged in the 
systematic suppression of democratic institutions. One need go no further than 
the colonial state in Rhodesia and the present fascist state in South Africa, to 
illustrate this point.
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It is futile to attempt to discuss the condition of human rights in Africa 
without an analysis of the type and nature of the state that has emerged in post­
colonial Africa. The character of the state itself is invariably determined by the 
economic and political processes occurring in a particular country.
Firstly, the economies of practically all African states arc dominated by 
imperialism which plunders their natural resources and extracts super profits 
through multinational corporations and transnational companies. Economic 
underdevelopment is the norm. These economies arc characterized by the export 
of cheap primary commodities and the import of expensive manufactured goods. 
The peasants are often neglected, exploited and forced to grow cash crops like 
cotton, tobacco and cocoa in order to earn foreign currency to purchase consumer 
luxuries for the local bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisic who control the appara­
tus of state power. On the other hand, the African working class toils in 
multinational corporation owned industries, factories and other enterprises to 
scratch a miserable existence. The economic condition of the working class is 
often little better than under colonialism. The working class lives in dehumani­
sing ghettos. -
Mass unemployment, poverty, starvation, and disease loom very large in 
many African countries. This must inevitably be so if Africa continues to be 
dominated by imperialism through direct foreign aid and/or through the activi­
ties of transnational corporations. The role of transnational corporations in the 
exploitation of Africa is summarized by S. Maltsey in An Illusion o f Equal 
Rights, op cit, where he states that:
“A sad result of the activjty of transnational corporations is that the 
net profit exported from developing countries via the channels of 
private capital investment exceeds the sum increases of private 
investment in these countries economies.”23
' r
The system of AID with its attendant debt problem which has become 
unpayable for most Third World countries further entrenches the dependence of 
African economies. It is now accepted that the United States of America earns 
4 dollars in interest out of every single dollar it gives the Third World in the form 
of economic aid by way of loans.
This gloomy economic condition gives birth to a specific kind of neo-colonial 
state that expresses the general interests of the alliance of international capital, 
the local bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie in the control of the state. This neo­
colonial surrogate state is characterized by a political leadership that is alienated 
from the mass of the people. This gives rise to undemocratic constitutions 
founded on reactionary nationalism. Quite often the surrogate state assumes the
Human Rights Conditions Under Post-Colonial States o f Africa
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character of a military dictatorship because of the anarchic looting and unbridled 
corruption of the petty-bourgeoisie political parties which fail to control internal 
contradictions.2,1
1
These kind of states are bom out of the economic conditions occasioned by 
imperialism which exploits the mass of the African working people. The post­
colonial state, being a surrogate state, depends for its survival on the repressive 
apparatus inherited from its colonial predecessor. These repressive apparatuses 
are readily used against the working people whenever they demand the abolition 
of unemployment, poverty, exploitation and fascist tendencies within the ruling 
cliques. As Von Freyhold has stated:
“The metropolitan bourgeoisie needs activist states on the periphery, 
states that are strong enough to suppress, by whatever means, growing 
social contradictions and states that can make foreign investments 
profitable and profits secure despite various unfavourable circum­
stances within the national and world economy.”24 5
Those states that serve the interests of foreign capital and those of the local 
bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeousie must keep the working people and peasants 
under leash. Here the people are managed and controlled as an unconscious 
mass, such States cannot resolve the acute problems of underdevelopment, 
hunger, starvation, unemployment and poverty. The people who suffer from all 
these problems inevitably agitate against their rulers who then use repressive 
methods to maintain their rule in alliance with foreign capital. It is against this 
background that gross violations of political and civil rights occur, not to 
mention economic and social rights which are totally negated by underdevelop­
ment and economic dependence.
. A few examples will suffice to illustrate the point. In Kenya, the national 
economy is managed entirely in the interests of international capital while the 
mass of the people are on the brink of poverty, hunger and starvation. The 
progressive intellectuals dissatisfied with the management of the economy have 
sought to challenge President Arap Moi’s Government, which has reacted in the 
most savage manner, engaging in mass detention of its political opponents, 
torturing detainees, murdering University students and journalists. Any political 
dissention, even if it is within the narrow framework of the ruling party is labelled 
subversive and dealt with ruthlessly and swiftly. Trumped up charges are framed 
and brought against students and political opponents. A totally tamed and 
subservient judiciary routinely sends the opponents of the neo-colonial govem-
24 See generally K Makamurc, “The question of Democracy and the Current Crisis 
in Africa”, unpublished text of a paper written for the then Law Department, U.Z, 
Harare, 1986, pp. 2-5
25 M. Von Freyhold, ‘The Post Colonial State and its Tanzanian Version Contribu­
tion to a Debate”, in Othman Haroub, The State in'I'anzania: Who Controls it and 
Whose Interest does it Serve?
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ment to long terms of imprisonment.26 In Zambia, not only are the working 
people constantly taking to the streets to protest against high prices of consumer 
goods, but the petty-bourgeois elements are also disenchanted with a “system 
where the management of the economy has led to chronic shortages of consumer 
goods and where the personal rule of the leader does not allow flexible change 
of direction to resolve the problems of the middle-class in the economy.”27 
Within this scenario denials of human rights, detentions and other political 
intimidation are common place. Malawi has established a neo-fascist state which 
is no less ruthless than Amin’s Uganda or Bokassa’s Central African republic. 
In Malawi any form of opposition to the rule or policies of Dr. K. Banda, attracts 
executions by hired gangs. Most of Malawi’s progressive nationalists either 
languish in jail or have been killed. Can one honesdy speak of the protection of 
political and civil rights in a country characterized by the crude personal tyranny 
of Dr. Banda?
The list of undemocratic and neo-fascist African regimes is endless. One can 
immediately add Master Sergeant Doe’s cannibalistic regime, the military junta 
of Mobutu in Zaire and Tanzania’s One-Party dictatorship.
The political alienation of the mass of the people in African political systems 
results in direct threats to the continued rule of the executive office holders. To 
protect their offices the petty-bourgeois rulers either introduce neo-fascist one- 
party states or engage in the harassment of opposition parties which, in any case, 
often have the same policies as the ruling clique. K. Makamure vividly sums up 
the general scenario of African politics:
“In Africa, the bourgeois form of democracy has demonstrated itself 
to be the nearest thing to a political orgy. Election times turn out to be 
occasions for mass suffering. The petty-bourgeoisie political parties, 
which in conditions of neo-colonialism, each acquire financial patrons 
from among the multinational corporations whose behaviour in these 
times is identical to that of the punters at a race-course event, fight 
‘dirty’ elections in which the game at stake has no agreed rules. The 
ordinary masses are used simply as voting fodder. Campaigns are 
organised through paid gangs of political hooligans so that political 
gang-warfare often erupts in which many working class, peasant and 
lumpen lives are lost. Election times are often open seasons for 
political assassinations where political opponents are physically 
liquidated. Ballot boxes in some cases are filled well before the actual 
voting commences . . .  “28
Realising their inability to grant or recognize and protect political and civil
' 26 SeetherecentConstitutionofKenyaAmendmentActl988whichempowersthe 
President to dismiss judges virtually at will.
27 K. Makamure, op. cit., p.5
Ibid, p.728
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liberties, African leaders and their theoreticians have invented a “developmental 
theory” that seeks to justify their violation of political and civil liberties. This 
“developmental theory” seeks to draw a dichotomy between civil and political 
rights on the one hand and socio-economic rights on the other by holding that the 
immediate task of Africa is to develop and in the process of pursuing such 
development, civil and political rights are a hindrance and nuisance that prevents 
the realisation of economic development which, as is argued, will satisfy socio- 
econonic rights.29 Having consummated this fallacious theory African govern­
ments are then at liberty to violate political and civil liberties for economic 
development that never comes. As S.B.O. Gutto has observed:
“The fallacy of this thinking lies precisely on the fact that the control 
o f the means o f forces and production by minority ruling classes and 
imperialist monopoly capitalism in these societies make it impossible 
for development to take place at all and the little that is development 
is not for the masses who toil. The level of political repression 
perpetrated in the name of development in these societies when added 
to the lack of attainment of socio-economic well-being total up to 
absolute suspension of human rights.”30
In concluding this part it ought to be stated that the scenario that has been 
painted above clearly shows most African countries as ready made theatres for 
mass violations and denial of human rights
HUMAN RIGHTS IN ZIMBABWE
\
Historical Background
Zimbabwe was occupied by Britain in 1890 and thereafter the colonial 
settlers engaged in a series of brutal wars and mini-wars against the indigenous 
African peoples who attempted to resist colonialization. African resistance was 
crushed and the colony of Southern Rhodesia was established under the British 
Crown. Under colonial rule Africans were denied participation in the political 
affairs of the country. They were denied the right to vote, herded into infertile 
Native Reserves (later euthcmistically called Tribal Trust Lands) where they 
scratched a miserable subsistence existence. They were often plagued by 
diseases, hunger, poverty and starvation.
Those who left their allocated Tribal Trust Lands to work in the mines and 
towns were paid pitiable starvation wages. All sorts of discriminatory laws were
29 Sec A.G. Mower Jr, “Human Rights in Black Africa: A Double standard?” 9 
Human Rights Journal 39 (1976)
30 S.B.O. Gutto, “Responsibility of States, Transnational Corporations and Indi­
viduals in the Field of Human Rights to Social Development: A Critique.” 
Unpublished paper written in London, 1983, for the Centre for African Studies, 
SDAS.
'Y
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passed against them31 they were segregated against in a manner only slightly 
better than the present day blacks of South Africa. Their land was appropriated, 
their cattle taken away by the emergent white settler State. The process of 
colonialization and dispossession of the African people was fundamentally 
dehumanizing and constituted a total negation of human rights: a negation more 
crude and brutal than that of the hitherto existing feudal despotism.
In brief, what can be said is that the process of colonization was aggressive, 
brutal, bloody and inhuman. The white settlers having herded the African people 
into barren Tribal Trust Lands built up a formidable settler slate whose main 
functions were to develop capitalism under conditions which kept the African 
population in subjugation. Through the racial ideology of white supremacy the 
settler State mobilized all white settlers against blacks, who were forced to eke 
out a miserable existence.
The scenario in Rhodesia was thus one where seven million blacks scratched 
out a living at far below acceptable levels of poverty while some 287 000 whites, 
barely 3 percent of the population, enjoyed all the national wealth and the 
attendant privileges. The white minority, apart from being in sole control of the 
political processes, owned more than half of the country’s arable land, all of the 
meaningful businesses and industries and controlled all other spheres of social 
life. Blacks were confined by law and force to bleak urban townships and barren 
rural Tribal Trust Lands or squalid worker’s quarters on white commercial farms 
in which thousands of black children were undernourished.
This unjust and racist social structure was at the heart of the armed liberation 
struggle which lasted for 7 years and cost a minimum of 40,000 lives. The war 
was of such brutality and savagery that very few families remained untouched 
by it. The brutality of the Rhodesian army against the black population during 
the armed struggle for independence is well documented and needs no recital. 
Suffice to say that the Rhodesian fascist army executed African people cn mass, 
detained and tortured its opponents at will. There arc very few, if any, African 
leaders who were not brutally tortured under Smith’s regime which forccably 
confined several thousands of peasants into “concentration camps” as part of its 
strategy to deny guerrillas of the nationalist movement access to food.
Smith’s Rhodesia which received moral, political and material support from 
'virtually all imperialist countries, built up a formidable, cruel and savage army, 
police force and intelligence service to defend settler rule settler state. This 
apparatus of the settler state routinely violated and abused human rights without 
any accountability, since such abuses and violations were part of State policy 
against the African population. However, what is significant is that when 
Zimbabwe eventually obtained its political independence in 1980, it had gone
31 See for example, the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia, 1961; the Land Tenure 
Act, Chap. 148 the Electroral Act, cap. 5, the Industrial Conciliation Act, Chap. 
267 and African Education Chap. 233.
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through a brutal war of national liberation during which there was total non- 
recognition of human rights.
Virtually anything could be done under the vague notion of protecting state 
security and maintaining law and order.
The Independence government was faced with an unenviable task of building 
a nation out of the ruins of war. The new Government’s first talks was to 
dismantle the racist and authoritarian institutions of colonial Rhodesia. In 
addition, it had to undo a vast network of security apparatus that had routinely 
detained Africans, tortured diem, invaded their privacy and subjected a great 
number of them to summary executions. It had to deal with the problem of the 
material and economic deprivation of the Africans that had been occasioned by 
colonialism. The ZANU (PF) Party Programme clearly recognised these tasks 
and hence proclaimed that:
“There shall be recognized equality between all persons men and 
women. Persons of all colours, culture and backgrounds who identify 
themselves with a socialist Zimbabwe will have expanded opportuni­
ties to contribute fully towards the country’s development and to 
fulfill their own aspirations as human beings. No one will be permitted 
to exploit other free and equal citizens for his own benefits___
f
Broad democratic freedoms—speech press, assembly, association, 
movement—which have been taken away from the people of Zim­
babwe by the settlers will be restored and guaranteed in all citizens of 
a free, democratic, independent and socialist Zimbabwe. All political 
detainees and restricties will be released on the first possible occasion 
and reunited with their families. Existing concentration and detention 
camps will be closed and the buildings turned into adult education 
centres.
. .  .A ll the means o f production and distribution will be placed fully in 
the hands o f the people o f Zimbabwe as a whole. The present capital­
ist economic system .. .  will be abolished.
All the natural resources of Zimbabwe — the land, mineral, water, 
flora and fauna — belong to the citizens of Zimbabwe today and 
forever afterwards. Therefore there can be no private ownership of 
land and natural resources because they belong to the people as a 
whole,.. .  “ (emphasis added) (See ZANU Political Programme, No.
2., 1973, at pp.21-27
Accordingly, the new government was expected to solve the problem of 
peasant landlessness, working class exploitation and deprivation and to satisfy 
the broad economic needs of the people. In the background stood the apartheid 
regime constituting a threat to the sovereignity and independence of Zimbabwe. 
The new Government having inherited the settler colonial state intact had to
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entrust the defence of the new Government to an army, an airforce, a police force 
and an intelligence organisation that had strong links with S. Africa and whose 
loyalty to the new order was highly questionable. Faced with the ever present 
possibility of an attack from S. Africa, the new government made great strides 
in integrating the three main armies that had fought in the liberation war.
There was the Zanla army, the ZIPRA army, and the Rhodesian army. This 
delicate task was successfully carried out and indeed the fact that it was done so 
successfully remains one of the greatest achievements of Zimbabwe’s independ­
ence government. At the beginning very few believed that it could be done.
However, the process of integration was not always smooth. Mistakes were 
made, particularly in the treatment of cx-ZIPRA combatants who thereby 
became disenchanted. Some of them, together with some elements of Muzorcwa 
and Smith armies found a ready ally in South Africa which sponsored them to 
start a destabilization war in Matcbclcland. However the majority of cx-ZIPRA 
combatants spumed South African attempts at wooing them and started their 
own “dissident war” against the government, destroying equipment, burning 
stores, buses and homes, murdering and maiming people mostly in Matcbclcland 
and some parts of the Midlands. The new government had to respond to this 
threat that challenged its legitimacy. No responsible government could have 
allowed itself to be held to ransom by bandits and dissidents whatever legitimate 
grievances they may have had to take up arms. It is in exercising this legitimate 
right to defend the sovereignity of Zimbabwe that the government of Zimbabwe 
has been consistently indicted for grave violations of human rights in Matcbclc­
land and some parts of the Midlands.32
The Post-Independence Period
(i) Socio-Economic Rights
The Lancaster House Constitution, like all bourgeois Constitutions docs not 
recognize and guarantee socio-economic rights. Consequently, there is no legal 
framework within which the question of socio-economic rights can be discussed 
in Zimbabwe: As already outlined above the colonial socio-economic structure 
denied the majority of Africans virtually all socio-economic rights. They were 
denied access to arable land, denied equal and quality education, denied decent 
housing, denied adequate health facilities and denied access to employment. As 
a result most Africans were generally poor and lived in unproductive rural areas 
and bleak urban townships. /
The attainment of independence was, thus, seen by Africans as a first step v.
towards the eradication of all these colonial evils. The independence government .
has achieved-some degree of success, within the limits of capitalism, in 
addressing the question of socio-economic rights. Educational opportunities
32 The'security problems and the attendant violations of human rights that plagued 
Matebeland and the Midlands between 1982 and 1987 are discussed infra.
\
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have been greatly expanded, with primary education being (in theory at least) 
compulsory and free. An attempt has been made to expand health facilities and 
services to all sections of society under a National Health System in which low 
income persons have a right to free health services. For the employed minimum 
wages, which did not exist in Rhodesia, have been introduced and enforced for 
various categories of workers. However, the minimum wages have been continu­
ally eroded by the always increasing prices of consumer commodities needed by 
the working classes for subsistence.
However, the success story ends there. Otherwise the working class contin­
ues to live in bleak and overcrowded urban townships, now styled high density 
suburbs. The peasants remain in the overcrowded and unproductive Tribal Trust 
Lands, now styled Communal Lands. Eight years after independence, only 40 
000 families of the original target of 162 000 families have been resettled.33 More 
poignantly, the land question remains unresolved due to a variety of reasons, all 
of which have their roots in the maintenance of capitalism. The level of 
unemployment has reached crisis proportions. In short, the fundamental ques­
tions that were posed by all progressive elements at independence remain 
unanswered. How will the government liberate the “new state” from its external 
dependency and capitalist development? How will the government deal with the 
land question and how will it deal with the problems of mass unemployment and 
general poverty?
The Lancaster House settlement represented a great setback for the revolu­
tionaries of the Patriotic Front alliance because it determined that the socio­
economic structures of colonial Rhodesia would remain intact. The protection of 
the inviolability of private property by the Constitution meant that the new 
government could not legally expropriate landed property and redistribute it to 
the dispossessed Africans.34 The protection of private property meant that the 
land question, which was one of the primary issues of the liberation war, would 
remain unresolved. Commenting on this issue Andie Astrow says:
“The extent of the compromise by the PF leaders can be measured by 
those sections of the Constitution referring to the crucial land ques­
tion. As one authority on land points out the cost of buying the 
estimated 40-60% of European land not being fully utilized would be 
so high that even if a new government of Zimbabwe were committed 
to implementing a comprehensive land resettlement programme under 
the constitution it would find it well nigh impossible to carry out.”iS 
(his emphasis)
33 See T.B. Ndoro, “The Land Question—Seven years after” Journal for Social 
Change and Development No. 18 1987 p. 22. See also the 1980-90 Five Years 
Development Plan.
34 See Section 16 of Zimbabwe’s Lancaster House Constitution.
„  . V
? Andre Astrow, Zimbabwe: A Revolution that Lost its way? Zed Press, London,
1983, atp.155. c
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This difficulty has meant that the socio-economic rights promised by 
political independence have remained a distant dream for the majority of 
peasants who were, deprived of arable land by the colonial settler state. The 
working class have fared no better in terms of fundamental socio-economic 
rights. Imperialism through multinational corporations and the vicious system of 
international AID has kept its grip on the economy of Zimbabwe. It could not be 
otherwise, as I. Mandaza says:
“The post-white settjer State is inherently unable to fulfill the popular 
demands of the masses.”36
The greatest beneficiaries of independence have been the white and black 
bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie of all races whose opportunities, under 
secure conditions of peace, have greatly expanded. I Mandaza puts it thus:
“In Zimbabwe today, we have a post-white settler colonial State in 
which the former settlers find themselves with such political and 
economic guarantees as would be the envy of any former colonisers in 
any decolonization process. Equally important, however, is that this 
situation in itself provides a framework for development and expres­
sion of class forces among the African people themselves, particularly 
the African petit bourgeoisie which has a vested interest in the post­
white settler colonial state.”37
(ii) Political and Civil Liberties
Independence brought an end to the brutal savagery of the authoritarian 
colonial regime. It expanded political and civil liberties in the sense that, the 
country, with the exception of Matebcleland and some parts of the Midlands, has 
been at peace and people have been free to participate in the political processes 
in the country and also free to move about their business unharassed since the end 
of the war in 1980.
However, mainly because of the external threat from South Africa and the 
internal threat from various political elements including the possibility of a white 
rebellion at independence the new government had to maintain some kind of 
strict security apparatus. The government chose to keep virtually intact the 
security agencies inherited from Rhodesia. The legal State of Emergency under 
which these security agencies had violated and abused human rights was 
renewed in 1980 and has been extended for various security related reasons in 
the present day.
During the colonial period there was no justiciable Bill of Rights in Rhodesia.
36 I. Mandaza, (ed) ZimbabwerThe Political Economy o f Transition 1980-1986, 
Codcscria, Dakar, 1986, p.25
37 Ibid, p.3
I
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The Lancaster House Independence Constitution introduced a justiciable Bill of 
Rights contained in Chapter III of the Constitution: This Bill of Rights incorpo­
rates generally all thecivil and political liberties, namely, the right to life, liberty, 
security of the person, protection of the law, freedom of conscience, of expres­
sion and of assembly, freedom from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, 
and protection of privacy and property.38 The usual exceptions to these rights are 
included in the Constitution.
What falls for discussion is the extent to which these fundamental typically 
bourgeois rights, have been protected and respected in Zimbabwe since inde­
pendence. The issue cannot be adequately canvassed outside an understanding 
of the political and military conflict in Matebcleland which has only been 
recently resolved after the achievement of unity between ZANU(PF) and (PF) 
ZAPU. ,
The political question in Matebcleland was directly linked to the disunity 
between ZANU(PF) and ZAPU which disunity reached its high watermark in 
1982 with the discovery of large quantities of arms in properties then owned by 
ZAPU. The ZANU(PF) government accused ZAPU of having plotted to over­
throw the government and dismissed some ZAPU members from the Cabinet. 
The dismissal of some ZAPU members from the Cabinet increased the pace of 
defections from the army by former ZIPRA cadres. The defections had started 
at a modest pace after the Entumbane clashes between ZANLA and ZIPRA 
forces in early 1981. The treason trial of the war time leadership of ZIPRA also 
increased the number of former ZIPRA elements taking to the bush either after 
defecting from the army or after demobilisation.
The dissidents started a mini-war in Matcbeleland and some parts of the 
Midlands. The government laid full responsibility for the operations and 
activities of dissidents on ZAPU, which in turn, consistently denied that it 
sponsored the dissidents. However, there was never any doubt that dissidents 
fought in the name of ZAPU and identi fled their cause as the expulsion of ZAPU 
from government and the illtreatment of ZAPU members by government. What 
has never been established is the extent, if any, to which the leadership of ZAPU 
and the ZAPU party structures symphathised with, and supported dissidents. "
In this scenario of disunity and animosity between ZANU(PF) and ZAPU, 
numerous ZAPU politicians and supporters, together with former ZIPRA cadres 
both within the army and those demobilized were rounded up and detained under 
suspicion of aiding and abetting dissidents. >
More damaging, however, was the cost of the dissident war in Matebeleland. 
The damage caused by dissident in Matebcleland and some parts of the Midlands 
was brutal and extensive. Between 1983 and April 1988 (when the government 
granted dissidents an amnesty under which virtually all of them surrendered to
v
38 See sections 11-23
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the police) the government reported no less than 750 murders, most of them 
ZANU(PF) officials, committed by dissidents in the affected regions. Dissidents 
extensively damaged and destroyed government property. By early 1985 no less 
than 400 000 acres of commercial farmland had been abandoned by white 
farmers fearful of their lives. In May 1987 alone dissidents murdered 4 white 
farmers in the Midlands Province. Towards the end of 1987 a group of dissidents 
callously hacked to death about a dozen missionaries and their families in the 
Esigodini; area of Matebeleland South. It is within the above context that 
government sent troops into Matebeleland and some parts of the Midlands. In its 
attempt to deal with dissidents the government used a variety of tactics which 
included the imposition of curfews and detentions. These military actions, 
carried out between 1983 and late 1986 gave rise to accusations of gross 
violations of human rights by the government On March 26, 1983 following 
these military operations the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace issued 
a statement which alleged that there was “clear evidence” of severe violations of 
human rights in the operational areas. The Catholic Bishops’ Conference 
followed this up by issuing a pastoral statement on March 29,1983 which stated 
that:
“We entirely support the duty of the government to maintain law and 
order, even by military means. What we view with dismay are the 
methods that have been adopted for doing so. Methods which should 
be firm and just have degenerated into brutality and atrocity . . .  
Violent reaction against dissident activity has, to our certain knowl­
edge, brought about the maiming and death of hundreds and hundreds 
of innocent people who are neither dissidents nor collaborators.. .  The 
facts point to a reign of terror caused by wanton killings, woundings, 
beatings, burnings and rapings. Many houses have been burned down. 
People in the rural areas are starving not only because of the drought, 
but because in some cases supplies of food have been cut off and in 
other cases access to food has been restricted or stopped.39
Other allegations of grave violations of human rights in Matebeleland came 
from Amnesty International which has, since 1983, consistently issued reports 
of abuses of human rights in Zimbabwe. The)World Guide to Human Rights, 
published by the Economist Magazine, in 1986 put Zimbabwe’s human rights 
rating at 45% as against a world average of 55%.
Perhaps the most comprehensive and detailed account of alleged human 
rights violations in Zimbabwe between 1983 and 1985 is to be found in 
ZIMBABWE:Wages ofWa’ a Report on Human Rights prepared by the Lawyer’s 
Committee for Human Rights and published in May, 1986. The Report gives 
accounts of numerous mass executions, harassment, detentions and detailed 
narrations of kidnappings and torture which make terrifying reading. Suffice to 
quote from pages 29-30 of the Report:
39 Catholic Pastoral Statement, dated 29 March, 1983.
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“The abuses have included mass detentions without charges, tortures, 
rape, beatings, abductions, unwarranted searches and seizures, the 
looting and destruction of private homes, and the extra-judicial 
execution of an estimated 1,500 civilians, perhaps many more.”
N
On its part the government of Zimbabwe always denied these allegations. 
However, what is important is that the military operations that gave rise to the 
allegations of human rights violations in Matcbclcland have now ceased since 
the conclusion of the unity accord in December, 1987 between ZANU(PF) and 
ZAPU. The unity agreement led to the Presidential Amnesty, announced on 19 
April, 1988. Under the Amnesty the government pardoned all dissidents who 
surrendered to the police before or on 31st May, 1988. All dissidents, responded 
to the Amnesty and surrendered. Peace has now returned to Matcbclcland and the 
Midlands.
Judicial Pronouncement on Human Rights Violations
While there has been persistent allegations of unlawful executions, killings 
torture and political kidnappings, very few cases related to these allegations have 
come to court. Two murder cases, related to or connected with military opera­
tions in dissident affected areas, have come before the courts. The first case came 
before the High Court as a result of an inquest verdict of a Bulawayo Magistrate, 
George Gcddcs who had found that an off-duty army officer, Lieutenant E. 
Ndlovu, his wife and two civilians, who had been travelling from Hwange to 
Bulawayo had died as a result of bayonet wounds inflicted on them by four 
members of the army who where carrying out military operations in the Lupane 
area of Matcbclcland. The High Court found the four accused guilty of murder 
with actual intent and sentenced them to death. On appeal to the Supreme Court 
the verdict of the High Court was confirmed, the Supreme Court observing that:
“What was established was that the appellants abducted the four 
unfortunate and innocent deceased from the petrol station (in Lupane) 
and, after subjecting them to torture and the two females to some 
degrading form of sexual abuse — they slaughtered them in the most 
atrocious, cruel and cold-blooded manner.”'10
The second case occurred in the LowcrGwcru area in October, 1984. Briefly, 
what happened, according to the findings of the Supreme Court, was that a 
prominent ZANU(PF) official and his wife had been brutally murdered by 
dissidents.
“At his funeral which was attended by the Governor of the Midlands 
Province, the late Benson Ndcmcra and the Officcr-in-Charge of 
Gweru Rural Police, Inspector Wurayayi inflammatory speeches were 
made and instructions given that dissident collaborators were to be 
killed and reprisals were to be undertaken.
40 ' S. Chayana, C.Simango, G. Chihwayi, and J . Gwatirerav State SC. 42/62 at p.5.
rImmediately after the funeral a large number of huts were set ablaze. 
[Presumably belonging to suspected dissident collaborators].... More 
significantly, however, it is alleged and again not denied by the State, 
that one Peter, suspected of leading the dissidents to the house of the 
murdered couple was shot there and then more or less in the presence 
of the authorities, and nothing was done to arrest his killcr.”4'
After these horrifying events the two accused, who were members of the 
Special Constabulary, by their own admissions:
shot to death [one Patrick Sibanda] a man who had been captured by 
others and was in their power. They did so quite deliberately and 
openly. The unfortunate deceased was forced to lie on or near some 
bushwood which had been collected in a donga. He was then, shot at 
several times by both appellants, who then with their companions set 
the wood on fire and partially destroyed the body.”41 2
On these facts the accused were tried and convicted of murder and sentenced 
to death by the High Court. However, on appeal, the Supreme Court while 
confirming the convictions changed the sentence from death to twenty years 
imprisonment finding extenuating circumstances in that:
“the moral blameworthiness for this murder, at least on the evidence 
placed before the court, attaches to persons other than appellants. 
These persons were vastly senior to the appellants, both in the police 
sphere and in the political sphere. Their influence and authority would 
seem, even if the evidence is exaggerated, to have been wickedly 
abused.”43
Itoughtto be underlined that the State brought those accused of thcschcinous 
crimes and violations of human rights to the courts and were dealt with in 
accordance with the ordinary laws of the country. This is a positive factor that 
.is worth noting, notwithstanding that in the latter ease the courts thought there 
were others who carried more moral responsibility for the crimes.
There have also been judicial findings on torture of arrested persons.44 The 
most famous ease is the ease of the State v Slatter and Others, H C-H -315-83, 
where the accused were acquitted on the basis that the confessions they had made 
to the police were inadmissible. In the course of his judgment Dumbutshena, J. 
(as he then was) observed that:
“The psychological effects of lengthy interrogation incommunicado
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41 /. Mutsunga andL. Gaba v theState S.C. 36/87at p.2. 42.30. ,
42 Ibid, p.l
43 Ibid, p.10 '
44 Torture is absolutely prohibited by section 15- of the Constitution and this 
prohibition cannot be derogated from even during a State of Emergency.
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incarceration and torture suffered at the hands of the police drive an 
accused to hopelessness.”45
Other cases where allegations and findings of torture have been made include 
Granger v Minister o f State, SC 83/84, The State v Sibindi, Case No BRM 377/ 
84 and S. Nhari, A Dhlodhlo, a Vundhla, F. Nyoni, AmosMoyo and Albert Moyo 
v The State, SC 9/87
A rather disturbing and astonishing case is the case of S. v Joseph Makando 
and others (an unreported case tried by the Bulawayo High Court, in July, 1986) 
in which the four accused were tried for the murder of Senator Ndlovu who had 
been murdered by armed gunmen at his home in Beitbridge during political 
disturbances. The accused challenged the admissibility of their unconfirmed, 
warned and cautioned statements on the basis that they had been assaulted and 
tortured by the police to compel them to make the confessions.
In the ensuing trial within a trial a then senior magistrate now Regional 
Magistrate, Mr Lawrence Kamocha, testified for the defence and gave evidence 
that the accused had appeared before him for confirmation of the statements and 
he had refused to confirm the statements because the accused had clcarjy been 
severely and brutally assaulted. The . evidence also showed that upon Mr 
Kamocha’s refusal to confirm the statements the police had taken the accused to 
a Gwanda magistrate who had also refused to confirm the statements and ordered 
the accused to be examined at a nearby hospital. This case is disturbing and 
astonishing because the police had the cynicism, arrogance and persistency to 
seek two different magistrates to confirm statements while the accused before 
them showed clear signs of severe assault. The High Court, correctly, it is 
submitted, found the statements inadmissible and acquitted the accused.
It may also be noted that there is currently pending in the High Court a case 
against the Minister of Home Affairs, the Minister of State security and the 
Director of Prisons instituted by about a dozen families from Silobela (Mid­
lands). The action seeks to compel the defendants to produce or disclose the 
whereabouts of certain men who were allegedly arrested by some security 
officers during 1985. The plaintiffs allege that people using vehicles similar to 
those used by security officers “arrested” or “abducted” the persons who have 
been missing since 1985. The defendants have denied any involvement or 
knowledge of the whereabouts of the missing persons.
. Yet another astonishing and frightening case is that of Banda v Minister o f 
Home Affairs and A.N. Pagiwa and N  Mhunhira, HC-H-243-87. The total 
incredibility of the facts of this case which amount to an unparalleled abuse of 
power by rouges and sadists in police uniforms and clothed with legal authority 
requires that we quote the facts in full as provided in Sansole J ’s judgment. The 
plaintiff, a mother of four children, lived with her boyfriend, one Claude Hang, 
at her house in Greendale, Harare.
45 At. p.10.
Z. L. Rev. Vol. 51987 81
“On the 6th of March, 1985, Hang was arrested by the police on 
charges connected with possession of or dealing in Mandrax.
As a result she was taken in by the police for questioning. She was 
questioned by the Second and Third Defendants. They first took her, 
in her own car, to her house in Greendale where she picked up a 
blanket. Thereafter, they proceeded to Machipisa Police Station and , 
then proceeded on to Soiitherton Police Station. And there she was 
made to spend the night in her car wrapped in a blanket. Thus, from 
then onwards she was subjected to persistent harassment and illtreat- 
ment by both Defendants and to degradation by the Third Defendant, 
in particular. She was wrongfully and unlawfully imprisoned by both 
Defendants during the following periods:
Total No. o f Days
(a) From midnight 6th April 1985 to 15th April 1985 9
(b) From 17th April to 19th April,1985 3
(c) From 24th May 1985 to 15th June,1985 23
(d) From 8th July 1985 to 9th July,1985 2
Total number of days 37
The prime mover, star villain and rouge was the Third Defendant. 
Initially, he harassed her over Hang. He wanted her to give informa­
tion on Hang. Subsequently, he harassed her for his own selfish ends. 
He was given to contacting her by telephone and telling her to call at 
1 the police station. When she did, he would question her about man­
drax and detain her at the police station until knocking off time. Then 
he would tell her to drive him places, in her own car. She was coerced 
into obliging him for he had made it quite plain to her that refusal 
would be visited by having her locked-up in police cells.
On the 6th April, 1985, she received a telephone call from both 
, Defendants in which they informed her that they were coming to fetch 
her and have her locked up. They duly did. They took her away to 
Norton Police Station and had her locked up there. She was being 
accused of being in possession of Mandrax. She remained in cells 
until the 11th of April, 1985. During this period both Defendants 
interrogated her and inquired whether she was then ready “to talk”. 
When she indicated that she had nothing to say, they removed her 
from Norton and took her to Waterfalls,Police Station, in Harare and 
there they detained her in cells until the 15th April, 1985. During this 
period, and once again both Defendants visited her at the cells. She 
pleaded with them to allow her to send some money to her children. 
They collected the money from her and went to give it to hcr-children. 
She was later released from the cells on the same day.
82 Ncube, Human Rights in Zimbabwe
On the 17th April, 1985, the Second Defendants called for her at her 
place of employment, a commercial bank, and took her to the Central 
Police Station. He told her that she was going to be locked up. 
However, she was merely detained at the offices.
In the evening the Third Defendant and another police detail took her 
to Southerton Police Station and there the Third Defendant had her 
locked up. She remained in cells until the 19th April, 1985, when she 
was released. On the 21st April, 1985 both Defendants called at her 
house. They said that they wanted to take her away with them but, 
later, they decided against it and suggested that she call on them, the 
following day, at the Central Police Station. She duly did. She was 
detained at the offices until 5.00 p.m. when she was taken to Water­
falls Police Station. The Second Defendant and another Police detail 
used one car and the Third Defendant used her own car. When they 
were in the car, the Third Defendant revealed to her that if she did not 
wish to be detained, she should agree to sleep with him. She took 
offence at the suggestion because she did not like the Third Defendant 
at all. She dithered. And then, the Third Defendant made a remark to 
this effect Well if you do not want then I will go and, lock you up. As 
a result she was constrained to acquiesce for fear of being locked up.
In addition, she was influenced by the concern for her children who 
had been left alone at home and the fear of losing her job for her 
employer had already suggested that she resign because of these 
frequent arrests and consequent absences from duty.
Ultimately, they arrived at Waterfalls. The Third Defendant left her in 
the car and went to speak to the Second Defendant and returned later 
and uttered words to this effects —
It is okay, you won’t be locked up now.
Thereafter, they proceeded to Highficld, where she dropped him off at 
Machipisa Shopping Centre. On the 1st May, 1985, she received a 
telephone call from the Third Defendant. He told her to come and 
fetch him from a certain hotel, which is somewhere along Salisbury 
Street. She went, though she had protested to him that she had visitors. 
They drove down Beatrice Road and proceeded to Chitungwiza and 
called at Nyamutamba Hotel, where he booked a room and had sexual 
intercourse with her. She says that she felt terrible. I felt hate for him. 
They whiled away time in the room until about 2.00 a.m., when she 
complained that it was getting too late, she had to get back home.
They drove away and she dropped him off at Highfield and she 
proceeded to her house.
On the 8th May, 1985, he once again summoned her to come and pick 
him up at the same place along Salisbury Street. She did. He told her 
to proceed to Waterfalls to his niece’s house. They remained there
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until about 10.30 p.m. She assumed that he would want to be dropped 
off at his house. This was not to be so. Instead, he insisted that she 
take him to her house and spend the night with her. She protested 
saying that this would cause her embarrassment with her children. He 
was not concerned. Instead, he warned her that if she were to refuse he 
would have her locked up. In the result she was constrained to 
acquiesce. That night he once again, had sexual intercourse with her.
In a bid to spare her children the embarrassment, she sent them away 
by bus, early in the morning.
On the 11th May, 1985, he summoned her to come and pick him up at 
Salisbury Street. She did. He then told her to drive him to Chihota 
Communal Lands where he sought to buy cattle. There were no cattle 
for sale. And so he told her to drive him to his communal home in the 
same area. Upon their return, he insisted that he spend the night with 
her at her house. They had sexual intercourse. Once again, in a bid to 
save her children from the embarrassment, she sent them away, by 
bus, early in the morning. He spent that morning with her until 
afternoon, when he told her to drive him to Highfield. On the 18th 
April, he summoned her to pick him up at an hotel in Highfield. When 
she resisted, he reminded her that but for him she would be in 
Chikurubi Prison. Thus she acquiesced. She drove him to his niece’s 
place in Waterfalls, where they had some drinks. Afterwards, he said 
that he wanted her to take him to her house and spend the night Since 
she had some drink, she plucked up courage and refused. An argument 
ensued in the car which lasted from about 10.30 to 1.00 a.m. When he 
realised that she was adamant, he became belligerent and pulled her 
out of the car by her hair and twisted her head round and caused her to 
fall face down. He put his foot on her back and pressed her hard to the 
ground until she experienced some difficulty in breathing and at the 
same time he continued twisting her head by pulling her hair. He 
laughed as he did it. She feared for her life because of the intensity of 
the brutality and the cynical manner in which it was perpetrated. In the 
result, she conceded defeat. He put up at her house and had sexual 
intercourse with her. Early, in the morning she arranged for a taxi to 
call and pick him up.
By this time she had become desperate. Thus on the 20th May, 1985 
she resolved to go and see the Minister of Home Affairs.
She contacted his office by telephone to make an appointment She 
was not able to secure an appointment over the telephone. She called 
in person at the Ministry the following day. In the afternoon both 
Defendants called in perspn at her house. The Second Defendant 
declared that he had come to apologise on behalf of the Third Defen­
dant for what he had done to her on the 18th May, 1985, namely the 
assault She called the Second Defendant aside and informed him that 
she feared that the Third Defendant may kill her. He assured her that
he would see to it that, that was not to happen. At this juncture the 
third Defendant got out of their car and protested at the private 
discussion that was taking place and claimed that after all,they had 
merely come to tell her that she was to call at the police station the 
next day. They left.
The following day they called at her place of work. In her presence the 
Second Defendant announced that the Third Defendant was threaten­
ing to have him transferred to another department She decided against 
going to see the Minister of Home Affairs because she was now of the 
belief that it would be pointless, to do so, as the Third Defendant had 
always bragged to her about his strong contacts with the Minister. She 
feared that the Minister might tell on her to the Third Defendant.
On the 23rd May, 1985 the Third Defendant contacted her by tele­
phone and summoned her to come and fetch him at the same place and 
in the usual manner, after working hours, she did.
They drove to the Harare Kopje and parked there. Thereafter, they 
drove toward Highfield. She assumed that he wanted to be dropped off 
there. However, this was not to be. Instead, he demanded that she take 
him with her to her house. She protested but in vain. En route, he 
indicated two houses to her and declared that behind them, there was a 
house in which a certain woman lived. He claimed that he had 
bludgeoned her to the extent that she was now mentally confused. As 
a result, she felt scared and threatened. And as if to drive the point 
home he uttered to her words to this effect —
An ambulance will pick you up beside your car and if you are lucky 
you would wake up in hospital.
As a result when they got to the first bus stop into Highfield, and 
whilst the car was in motion she opened the door and jumped out, in a 
desperate bid to get away from him. He made chase after her. As it 
was at a bus stop people were milling around. She sought refuge and 
shelter behind a certain man. Yet this did not deter him. She was 
shouting for help saying “Somebody please help me”. Someone who 
she believed to be a policeman produced his identity and showed jt to 
the Third Defendant, but to no avail. He continued to pursue her until 
he got hold of her and took her back to the car. She felt helpless and 
humiliated. When they got back to the car he said words to this 
effect—
You have no power over me. I work for the Minister of Home Affairs.
He made threats and then assaulted her with an open hand. He 
threatened to have her locked up for the night and then taken to the 
Drug Section the following morning. Thus she acquiesced and they
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proceeded to her house where he spent the night and had sexual 
intercourse with her. He left the follpwing morning by taxi. She then 
saw him again the following day. He came to her place of employ­
ment with the Second Defendant They then left and told her that they 
were proceeding to Bindura to see Hang , her lover. It happened that 
she was also proceeding to Bindura that same day. Upon arrival at 
Bindura, they followed her to the prison and threatened to have her 
locked up because they claimed that she had come to Bindura to 
interfere with their investigations. Indeed they had her locked up at 
Bindura Police Station, th ey  left her there until the following Mon­
day, the 17th of April,, 1985. Whilst at Bindura she consulted with 
one Inspector Madoro. She told him the whole story. When the Third 
Defendant arrived some two hours later, she was called from the cells. 
A quarrel ensued between him and Inspector Madoro. He was 
complaining that Inspector Madoro had no right to speak to her in his 
absence. Inspector Madoro warned him to be careful lest she put him 
into trouble. He said that he had nothing to fear because after all the 
Minister knows all about it. Thereafter, he took her to Norton Police 
Station in a police vehicle. Her car was left at Bindura. On arrival at 
Norton, he changed his mind and drove to Highfield where he picked 
up the Second Defendant.
Then they wanted to drive to her house but she resisted. He threatened 
to have her locked up at Hatfield Police Station and so they proceeded 
there. On arrival, he changed his mind and decided that he was going 
to keep her hostage until after they had seen the Minister the following 
day. Thus they proceeded to her niece’s place in Waterfalls. They 
were both put up for the night at his niece’s place and she slept with 
him.
The Second Defendant called at the niece’s place the following day to 
pick them up. They proceeded to her house, where they washed and 
changed in readiness to go and see the Minister. Whilst she was 
having a bath she heard the Third Defendant make a telephone call. 
She picked up the receiver of the extension and listened in.
She heard him speak to a lady at the Ministry and claiming that she 
was his girlfriend whom he had arrested and that she was threatening 
to report him to the Minister. In the result he was coming there with 
her.
As they were driving into town to see the Minister, a quarrel ensued 
between her and Third Defendant over whether or not she should 
consult with the Minister. Then and there the Third Defendant told the 
Second Defendant to drive to Rhodesville Police Station, where he 
locked her up in cells. She remained there until the 1st June, 1985. 
Thus she was under his control from 24th May, 1985 to 1st June 1985.
86 Ncube, Human Rights in Zimbabwe
On the 1st June, 1985 she was moved out of the cells and taken to 
Mabvuku Police Station where she was detained for a week up to the 
7th June. Then she was moved to Hatfield Police Station, where she 
was further detained until the 14th June, 1985. They took her out and 
drove to Norton for further detention. However, they changed their 
minds and proceeded to Bindura. They wanted her to talk to Hang 
about the whereabouts of Mandrax. They sought her to do the talking 
whilst they were eavesdropping. They had hoped to have him trapped. 
It did not happen. Thereafter, they drove her back to Waterfalls where 
they had her locked up in cells, until the next day when she was 
released. She collected her car from the Central Police Station, on the 
17th June, 1985. During this entire period from the 24th May to 15th 
June, she was not taken before a magistrate. Then there was a lull until 
the 5th July, 1985, when the Third Defendant contacted her by 
telephone seeking to know what he thought she had told Hang’s legal 
practitioner. He summoned her to meet him at Amato Centre, in Julius 
Nyerere Way. Upon arrival he got into her car and told her to drive to 
Chitungwiza where he booked a room at Nyamutamba Hotel. They 
spent the night there together. He had sexual intercourse with her. The 
Second Defendant called at the hotel, he required her to return to the 
hotel that same day, she did. And the Third Defendant detained her 
there overnight. Once again, she had sexual intercourse with him.
On the 8th July, 1985, both Defendants picked her up at her home and 
detained her in cells at Rhodesville Police Station until the following 
day when they took her to make a statement incriminating Hang. She 
declined to do so saying that she had nothing to say. The Third 
Defendant told her what to say in the Statement. She did, because they 
had threatened to make her a co-accused with Hang.
Later in the day the Third Defendant demanded to spend the night 
with her at her house. She protested saying that her grandmother was 
at home. He was not concerned. He slept with her. She felt embar­
rassed and humiliated.
On the 11th of July, 1985, the Third Defendant, once again, spent the 
night with her at her house and had sexual intercourse with her.
On the following day, she consulted a legal practitioner, who arranged 
for her to make a sworn statement before a Magistrate. In the company 
of this legal practitioner, she went to make a complaint at the Police 
Headquarters and she saw one Mr Muchemwa. He referred her to the 
General Police Station. That night the Third Defendant had summoned 
her to meet him at what had now become the usual place. She did not 
turn up. She was put up at a friend’s place in Eastlea.
The following day, the Third Defendant called at her place of work 
and remonstrated with her. Then and there he started chasing her
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around in the office and within the glare of her workmates. Eventually 
he grabbed and dragged her away and they went to the Police Head­
quarters. They saw a very senior officer, one Mr Chingoka. Mr 
Chingoka told the Third Defendant, that the police were looking for 
him and that he should let her go. He did not respond. Instead, he told 
Mr Chingoka that he wanted to have her locked up. So an argument 
ensued between him and Mr Chingoka just gave up and left her at his 
mercy. She was crying. Subsequently, he let her go. On the 15th of 
July, 1985, she found him waiting for her at her place of employment. 
He had come to take her to court. She appeared in court on a charge of 
possession of mandrax. She was remanded in custody but was later 
admitted to bail. Thereafter, she appeared in Court, regularly, for 
further remand until a magistrate put a stop to it for want of prosecu­
tion, on the 5th August, 1986.
These many acts of sexual intercourse to which she was obliged to 
submit under duress caused her mental anguish and distress. They 
made her feel used and degraded.
It is upon these facts that Plaintiff is basing her claims. In my view, it 
is a harrowing account of an untrammelled abuse of power by rouges 
and villains.”46
That such abuse of power, such flagrant violations of human rights can 
happen right in the capital of Zimbabwe and go on for such a long period is 
extremely frightening. Indeed, that the police force has among its ranks such 
rouges and sadists is astonishing. The facts of this case would be shocking even 
if it had happened in a fascist state, let alone in a democratic country.
However, what is most disturbing is that the concerned police officers have 
not so far been prosecuted for their astounding abuse of power and for their 
criminal acts against the plaintiff. If such things can happen and go unpunished 
by the State how can people have confidence in the country’s justice system? The 
plaintiff’s consolation is that Sansole J, awarded her damages of $18 500 for 
wrongful imprisonment, $1 500 for assault and $8 500 for rape.
The facts of the case of S v Charowa which was tried in the High Court 
recently, but in which no judgment has as yet been passed, also call into question 
the effectiveness of the police in protecting the people. The facts, as presented 
by the State, were that during political disturbances in Kwekwe, sometime in 
1985 the defendant led a group of protestors to the Kwekwe Police Station where 
the deceased had taken refuge. The defendant and his group forcibly removed 
from police protection the deceased, dragged him to the open grounds of the 
police station and assaulted him to death having accused him of being a supporter 
of dissidents.
46 At pp. 1-10
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 ^ That a person who has sought protection from the police can be forcibly 
removed from their custody and be killed right in the eyes of the police is difficult 
to believe and yet, in this case, it did happen. However, the only positive aspect 
of this case, unlike the Banda case, is that the perpetrators of the crime were 
brought to trial and will receive justice in accordance with the ordinary laws of 
the country.
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY 
AND PREVENTIVE DETENTION
The history of the State of Emergency goes back to 1965 when shortly before 
the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (U.D.I.) by the Smith regime, the 
Governor of Southern Rhodesia on 5th May 1965 declared a State of Emer­
gency.47 The State of Emergency has been renewed for one reason or another on 
a six monthly basis ever since. Under the Lancaster House Constitution the legal 
basis for the declaration of a Slate of Emergency is section 68. The existence of 
a S late of Emergency perm its certain derogations from the Declaration of Rights 
contained in Chapter III of the Constitution and allows the State to lawfully 
detain persons under specified circumstances and having observed the laid down 
procedures and safeguards.
Zimbabwe’s Declaration of Rights is modelled on the United Nations 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. The Declaration provides for 
the right of life, personal liberty, freedom from torture, inhuman and degrading 
treatment, arbitrary search or entry, freedom of expression, freedom of Assem­
bly and association, freedom of movement and freedom from discrimination. 
Section 24 establishes an extraordinary right to apply directly to the Supreme 
Court for redress where a contravention of the provisions of the Declaration of 
Rights is alleged.
During a State of Emergency most of the rights can be suspended. More 
precisely, the State can suspend the following rights; personal liberty, freedom 
from arbitrary search or entry, freedom of expression, freedom of movement, 
freedom of assembly and freedom from discrimination.48
On the other hand, the State of Emergency cannot be invoked to suspend the 
right to life, protection against slavery and forced labour, protection against 
torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, freedom from deprivation of prop­
erty, freedom of conscience and secure protection of the law.49
Preventive Detention
The legal basis for preventive detention is the Emergency Powers (Mainte-
47 See Proclamation 51 of 1965
48 See section 25 as read with para.l of the Second Schedule.
Ibid.49
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nance of Law and Order) Regulations50 (the Regulations). Section 53(1) of the 
Regulations empowers a police officer to detain any individual for a period of up 
to 30 days if he reasonably suspects that such individual has acted or is about to 
act in a manner prejudicial to public safety or public order. Section 21 permits 
a police officer to detain pending inquiries a person for up to 30 days if he has 
reason to believe that there are grounds that would warrant that person’s 
indefinite detention under section 17 of the Regulations. Section 17 itself permits 
the Minister of Home Affairs to authorize under his hand theindefinite detention 
without trial of any person if it appears to him that it is expedient in the interests 
of public safety or public order that that person be detained.
A person who is detained under the Emergency Powers Regulations is 
entitled to certain mandatory constitutional safeguards contained in the Second 
Schedule to the Constitution. These safeguards are that:
(1) He shall be informed as soon as reasonably practicable after the 
commencement of his detention and in any event not later than 
seven days thereafter, of the reasons for his detention.51
(2) He shall be permitted at his own expense to obtain and instruct. 
without delay a legal representative of his own choice and to hold 
communication with him.52
(3) His case shall be submitted not later than thirty days (during a 
State of Emergency) after the commencement of the detention for 
review by the Review Tribunal which is established by Part III of 
the Emergency Powers Regulations.53
(4) The Review Tribunal shall review his case “forthwith”.54
50 Statutory Instrument 458 of 1983.
51 Para. 2(l)(a). See Paweniv Minister o f State (Security) HH-180-84 and Minister 
o f Home Affairs and Anotherv Austin & Another S/C 79/86, where it was held that 
a detainee is entitled to be provided with sufficient reasons and information to 
enable him to know what is alleged against him so that he can make a meaningful 
representation when his case comes before the Review Tribunal. He must thus be 
provided with all material particulars which form the foundation of his detention. 
Vague, imprecise and bald general allegations will not suffice.
52 Para. 2(l)(a). See Minister o f Home Affairs v Dabengwa and Another 1982(1) 
ZLR 236 where it was held that the right of access to a lawyer applies from the 
very moment of detention. The issue of whether or not denial of access invalidates 
the detention has not been ruled upon.
53 Para. 2(l)(b). See York v Minister o f Home Affairs and Another 1982(2) ZLR 48 
(S), Dabengwa v Minister o f Home Affairs and Another 1984(2) SA 345 (S) and 
Bull v Minister o f Home Affairs and Others 1987(1) SA 422(H).
?4 Para. 2(1 )(b). See also Minister o f Home Affairs and Another v Dabengwa 
1984(2) SA 345(S).
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Paragraph 2 of the Schedule also gives the Review Tribunal power to 
recommend the release of the detainee if there is insufficient cause for detention. 
However, the President can reject the recommendation and if he does so he shall 
cause to be published in the Gazette a notice that he has rejected such recommen­
dation.
When these safeguards arc breached the detainee has a right to apply to the 
High Court for redress. Numerous cases have come before the courts where 
detained persons have sought redress in relation to violations of these safeguards.
What is important to note is that these safeguards are mandatory55 and not 
discretionary and ordinarily a breach f a mandatory constitutional provision 
should invalidate the detention order and thereby entitling the detained person 
to his release. In York v Minister o f Home Affairs and Another H H -218-32 the 
High Court ruled that the failure to submit a case to the Review Tribunal within 
thirty days was an omission which went to the root of the detention and 
invalidated the detention order.
However, in the later case of Minister o f Home Affairs and Another v 
Dabengwa 1984 (2) S A 345(5), the Supreme Court, relying mainly on irrelevant 
and sometimes discarded foreign cases ruled that failure to review a case 
“forthwith” by the Review Tribunal did not invalidate the detention order and, 
therefore, did not entitle the detainee to an order of release. The detainee’s 
remedy was a mandamus to compel the Review Tribunal to review his case. With 
respect, it is submitted that such an approach fails to take into account that the 
constitution is the Supreme law of Zimbabwe and that anything not done in 
accordance with the mandatory provisions thereof must be a nullity.56 57Failure to 
comply with a mandatory provision should invalidate the detention order and 
thereby entitle the detainee to his release.
By way of concluding this part it ought to be stated that both the High Court 
and Supreme Court have shown themselves to be willing to protect the right of 
individuals to personal liberty. As Reynolds J. stated in Minister o f Home Affairs 
v Allan HH-202-85:
“Since time immemorial the liberty of the individual has been re­
garded as one of the fundamental rights of man in a free society . . .  
The protection of this right is enshrined in the Constitution of Zim­
babwe, and the Courts will certainly play their part in preserving this 
right against all infringements and all attempts to erode or violate the 
principle involved.”51
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55 See York v Minister o f Home Affairs, HC-H-218-82 atp.16
56 PP. 51-55 See J. Hatchard. “Breach of Constitutional Safeguards in Preventive
Detention Cases” Z.L.R., Vol. 3, 1985 114, atpp.115-118. '
57 At p.8 of.
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Popular Enjoyment o f the Rights Enshrined in the Constitution.
The fundamental question is whether or not the civil and political rights 
enshrined in the Constitution of Zimbabwe are capable of enjoyment by the 
majority of the people? This question may be dealt with in the context of one of 
the most hallowed of the civil rights proclaimed by the bourgeoisie after their 
triumph over feudalism. The bourgeoisie declared that everyone is equal before 
the law. This right is incorporated in section 18 of Zimbabwe’s Constitution 
which provides that:
“ 18)1) Every person is entitled to the protection of the law.”
However, this protection of the law is available only at one’s “own ex­
pense”58. What this means is that for a person to obtain protection of the law he 
must “obtain and instruct a legal representative” at his “own expense”. Failing 
that, he must represent himself in whatever legal proceedings arc brought against 
him or are instituted by him with the exception of criminal proceedings for which 
the accused may be sentenced to death, in which case he is provided with a legal 
practitioner. He must represent himself against a background of a legal system 
riddled with complicated procedures and “elaborate technicalities and formali­
ties incomprehensible even to the most educated non-lawyer bourgeoisie.”59.
In a country, like Zimbabwe, where access to lawyers has always been a 
privilege of the rich and where the door to legal services for the working people 
has always been closed due to their economic and material deprivation, it is 
cynical in the extreme to speak of equality before the law or equal protection of 
the law. The provision of protection of the law reduces itself to naught if one 
realises that the majority of Zimbabweans are without the material means or 
resources to hire lawyers in order to mobilize their limited rights. The European 
Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg has held that the provision of equal 
protection of the law is an empty shell if it is not accompanied by effective 
material assistance to enable persons to pursue their rights in the courts with the 
assistance of lawyers.60 There is no doubt that there can be no “fair trial” if one 
person is represented by a lawyer and the other unrepresented as happens in most 
criminal cases. Further, as the former Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamen­
tary Affairs, E. Zvobgo, once said when he was a board member of Amnesty 
International:
“It is meaningless for a state to proclaim that every person shall have 
recourse to the courts unless the procedures for doing so exist and can 
be readily utilized.”61
58 See Sections 13(3) and (18 (3) (d).
59 See generally S.B.O. Gutto “The Political Economy of Legal Aid Advice 
Services"Z L .R ., Vol. 3, 1985,1.
60 See the case of Airey v Ireland, ECHR, 1979.
61 E.J.M. Zvobgo, “The Abuse of Executive Prerogative: A Purposive Difference 
Between Detention in Black Africa and Dentetion in White Racist Africa", 
Human Rights Issue, Vol. 4. 1976.
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Ignorance of the law by the mass of the people in Zimbabwe is phenomenal. 
Consequently, very few people know about their constitutional rights. Even if 
they knew poverty, material deprivation and the high cost of lawyers would make 
it well nigh impossible for them to even begin to assert these rights.62 In this 
respect, it is fitting to quote V.I. Lenin;
“No laws on earth can abolish inequality and exploitation so long as 
production for the market continues, and so long as there is the rule of 
money and the power of capital.”63
The crucial point is that the civil and political rights so laboriously protected 
in Zimbabwe’s Constitution arc impossible to assert, enjoy and defend for the 
mass of the people without the achievement of broad socio-economic rights. For 
so long as Precapitalist system remains intact these rights will forever be enjoyed 
by the propertied who can afford to mobilize the legal system to their favour. One 
can justifiably ask: What is the right to freedom and free participation in the 
political and other spheres of society’s life if a person is without a job and 
doomed to an aimless, destitute and maddening existence? What is the right to 
life given the degree of poverty, hunger and lack of access to meaningful medical 
care and facilities? What is the right to freedom and happiness when the peasants 
work round the clock only to remain at the same level of poverty? What is the 
right to equal protection of the law and the right to a fair trial when lawyers and 
court procedures are beyond the reach of the mass of ordinary people? Finally, 
what is freedom of expression or assembly when illiteracy is a perennial shadow 
, for most peasants and workers?
To ask these questions and to characterise these righ&'as “bourgeois rights” 
is not to advocate for the scraping of these political and civil liberties, but only 
to highlight that these rights are meaningless to the vast majority of the people 
unless they are accompanied by the achievement of broad socio-economic 
rights. These rights must be capable of being enjoyed by all the people. To enjoy 
these rights the mass of the people must have education, employment, material 
resources, health care and facilities and decent housing. However, the achieve­
ment of broad socio-economic rights is impossible for the people in countries 
dominated by imperialism, capitalism and exploitation.
THE FUTURE OF THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
The Declaration of Rights in Zimbabwe’s Constitution is the only remaining 
entrenched part of the constitution that cannot be repealed or amended without 
a 100% majority in the House of Assembly until 1990, 10 years after the
62 See generally, I Donovan, “Lawyers’ Role in the Protection of Human Rights in 
Zimbabwe”, Unpublished paper presented to the Law Society Summer School, 
Inyanga, October, 1986 and S.B.O. Gutto, op. cit
V.I. Lenin “The Land Question and the Fight for Freedom "Collected Works, Vol. 
1, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978 at p. 438
63
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attainment of independence. The question is whether or not the political 
leadership will retain the Declaration of Rights after that date. The clauses 
entrenching the inviolability of private property in the means of production must 
be substantially revised. There is no reason why the other progressive political 
and civil liberties should be repealed or be made non-jusliciablc. S. Mubako, 
Zimbabwe’s Minister of National Supplies, has irrefutably made the case for the 
importance and necessity for justiciable Bills of Rights in his article “Fundamen­
tal Rights and Judicial Review: The Zambian Experience.”6'' A positive indica­
tion that the Zimbabwean Government is committed to the protection of human 
rights after 1990 is that it ratified the African Charter of Human and Peoples 
Rights in May 1986. In the preamble to the Charter ratifying states reaffirm their 
adherence to the principles of human rights and freedoms contained in the 
declarations and conventions of the United Nations and the OAU. Article one of 
the Charter clearly states that:
“The member states of the OAU parties to the present charter shall 
recognise the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in this Charter and 
shall undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to 
them”, [emphasis supplied].
It is hoped that this indicates that the Zimbabwean government would retain 
a justiciable Declaration of Rights after 18th April, 1990.
CONCLUSION
Colonialism by its very nature amounts to legalized systematic denial of 
human rights in that it holds the indigenous people in bondage. To maintain this 
bondage the Rhodesian state not only enacted oppressive and tyrannical laws but 
also created and maintained a brutal and fascist police force, army and intelli­
gence service to enforce these laws. The result was the creation of an undemo­
cratic fascist and brutal legal system. Thus the culture of the Rhodesian legal 
system was one of severe brutality in both the content and enforcement of laws. 
This culture of brutality which permeated the entire Rhodesian state apparatus 
was inherited intact at independence. The brutal oppressive laws relating to state 
security have been largely maintained and have been extensively used in the 
post-independence period.
Accordingly, the post-independence period has seen a general maintenance 
of the Rhodesian culture of severe state brutality in the sense that the law 
enforcement agencies, which have remained largely the same, have been called 
upon to enforce the same brutal laws as existed under colonial rule. The 
continuity of brutal laws of Rhodesia into Zimbabwe is exemplified by the Law 
and Order Maintenance Act Chapter,* 65 and the Emergency Powers (Maintc-
64
65
Zimbawe Law Review, Vols. 1 & 2, 1983-1978, pp.97-132.
Witness the cruel and inconsiderable razing of “Squatters” homes reported in The 
Sunday Mail, 18-09-88.
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nance of Law and Order) Regulations under which thousands of people have 
been detained without trial.
Thus Zimbabwe, like her predecessor, Rhodesia, has been characterized by 
an undemocratic and brutal legal culture which is totally inconsistent with the 
full realization and enjoyment of human rights. The brutalization of the masses 
is demonstrated by the action of the law enforcement agencies in dealing with; 
the problem of the dispossessed landless peasants generally categorized as squat­
t e r s ^  the indiscriminate, on and off, rounding up of women and girls in 
operations to curb prostitution;66 the indiscriminate and incomprehensible 
shooting of unarmed young men and women attending a musical show at White 
City Stadium in February, 1988,67 the detention of hundreds of people without 
due regard to the procedures laid down by law as has been shown above and the 
brutal assaulting and battering of student demonstrators at the University of 
Zimbabwe and the Harare Polytechnic college by the police on 29th September, 
198868.
66 This indiscriminate and brutal rounding up of women and girls suspected of 
prostitution has even been defended in Parliament by the Minister of Home 
Affairs, Movcn Mahachi. Even the arrest and detention of a 16 year old school girl 
did not make the Minister feel obliged to give an .apology to the parents of the girl. 
See The Hansard 04-08-88 and The Herald, 25-09-88.
.67 See The Chronicle, 22-02-88 and 25.02.88.
68 The scenes at the University of Zimbabwe where baton-wielding policemen were 
sadistically assaulting students, throwing teargas cannistcrs into their Halls of 
Residence and chasing them all over campus were indistinguishable from the 
actions of the South African police in Soweto and other “black” parts of South 
Africa. These brutal scenes were given full coverage on the ZTV main news 
bulletin at 7.45 p.m. on 29th September, 1988 and one would have been forgiven 
for thinking that the film clip had come from South Africa.
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